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ABSTRACT 
In the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, many commentators and 
scholars debated the potential impact of the Games in China.  Some theorized that 
hosting the Games would lead to greater freedom and possibly democracyin China’s 
political life.  While the media debate focused on the optimistic possibility for change, 
scholars were more skeptical about the outcome.  In the debate, the 1988 Seoul Games 
were used as an example of the power of the Olympics to change a nation. 
Aside from Korea and China being located within the same region, there are few 
similarities between the two nations.  In order to assess the lack of positive political 
change resulting from the Beijing Games, this thesis reviews the political history of the 
Olympic Games, the controversial selection of Beijing as host city, and the policy 
changes that resulted from the Games.  While it is clear that Beijing’s hosting of the 
Olympics stimulated political consequences in China, the event in the near term did not 
increase freedoms or a propensity for democratic governance.  In conclusion, this thesis 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In order to assess the lack of positive political change resulting from the Beijing 
Games, this thesis reviews the political history of the Olympic Games, the controversial 
selection of Beijing as host city, and the policy changes that resulted from the Games.  
While it is clear that Beijing’s hosting of the Olympics stimulated political consequences 
in China, the event in the near term did not increase freedoms or a propensity for 
democratic governance.  In conclusion, this thesis evaluates the possibility of long-term 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I would like to thank Dr. Alice Miller and Dr. Robert Weiner for their invaluable 

























I. OLYMPIC GAMES IN BEIJING REPRESENT A 
POSSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA 
A. PURPOSE 
In the past, the Olympic Games have served as an opportunity to showcase 
economic and political success.  Japan, South Korea, and the Soviet Union all used the 
Games as a way to celebrate their achievements.  Each of these country’s Games, 
however, was met with controversy either with regard to the nation’s political structure, 
international stature, or satisfaction and freedom of its populace.  Whether international 
boycotts or domestic political transformation, the results in each case have been dramatic.  
As the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing approached, there was a great deal of speculation 
as to what impact hosting the Games would have on Chinese politics and policies. 
China was an unlikely host nation for the Olympic Games.  Human rights abuses, 
lack of freedom, and extensive environmnental damage made Beijing a surprising and 
controversial choice.  Based on historical precedent as well as current events, I assess 
China’s response to international pressures and media attention associated with the 
Olympic Games.  Additionally, I propose how this knowledge may be used by those who 
participate in the Games, as a soft power option in international diplomacy.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The goal of the Olympic Games is not to incite political transformation, but to 
establish a global rapport via sporting events.  The International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) claims that “the goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a 
peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practised without 
discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual 
understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.”1  The extent this 
charter has affected the IOC’s selection of host nations over the years is debatable.  
                                                 
1 International Olympic Committee. Promotion of Culture and Olympic Education, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/missions/culture/index_uk.asp, February 7, 2008. 
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Arguably, the IOC and the international community squander opportunities to advance 
human rights and freedoms by their failure to take more positive political action. 
As a rising regional power, China’s social and political progress is of great 
concern in preserving stability in Asia.  The region is becoming increasingly 
economically interdependent, and thus each nation’s stability has an impact on the region 
as a whole.  China also faces major social, political, and environmental issues that 
threaten future national development.  These issues were brought into the spotlight by 
both international media attention preceding the Olympics and recent domestic events 
including ethnic protests and major national disasters.  The way in which China 
responded to international pressure regarding these issues may illuminate the extent to 
which the IOC and the international community can use their influence to change China’s 
authoritarian social and political realities.  
The modern Olympics have been a badge of economic success and prestige on the 
international stage.  Host nations have felt it is essential to present themselves in a 
positive light.  If they are successful, host nations gain financially and in terms of 
international prestige.  If they are not successful, hosting the Games will turn out to have 
been a massive waste of resources and, possibly, a humiliating defeat.  The pressure 
associated with these goals can push a nation to suppress or increase personal freedoms 
and even lead to regime change.  The outcome of the Beijing Games adds to the record of 
political impact of Games over the past century, and so may influence how the Olympic 
Games can influence international political ideals in the future. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis investigates how Beijing manages China’s major social, environmental 
and political issues under the spotlight of international attention as it hosted the 2008 
Olympics.  In the months leading up to the Beijing Olympics, China saw major protests 
in Tibet and demonstrations in several countries through which the Olympic torch relay 
passed.  Beijing’s reaction to the Tibet protests was swift and brutal, involving military 
force.  Many were jailed, and foreign journalists were removed from the scene. Beijing’s  
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immediate goal was to prevent the events from going public on an international scale.  
Instead, the sporadic reports prompted massive international protests at Olympic Torch 
Relay sites.  
The IOC encourages the Olympics to be environmentally friendly.  Not only does 
Beijing have an abominable record of environmental safety, its air quality is some of the 
worst in the world.  In a city which was preparing for a major international sporting 
event, many of the athletes were concerned with respiratory health at the Games.  
Additionally, water was transported from drought-struck areas in order to provide 
Olympic athletes, journalists, and tourists with clean drinking water.  Will the changes 
that Beijing made to its environmental policies remain after the Games are over, 
improving Beijing’s environment? 
Similar issues exist in future host cities: Vancouver, London, and Sochi.  To the 
extent that Beijing’s hosting of the Games was a success, it will serve as a yardstick for 
future nations wishing to host the Olympic Games.  To the extent that Beijing’s Games 
were perceived as a failure, it may discourage bidding from states with similar goals.  
D. DISCUSSION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the Olympic Games ranges from books on political history and 
basic medal statistics to contemporary magazines, journals, and newspapers discussing 
the current year’s Olympic event.  For the purposes of this thesis, I focus on the political 
history, soft power, and Chinese foreign policy, as well as contemporary publications 
specifically related to the Beijing Games.   
1. Boycotted Games 
 While many nations have been individually banned from competing in the Games, 
it is rare to have an international boycott of a city’s Games.  In fact, just the threat of a 
boycott prompted South Korean protests, followed by a restoration of democratic 
processes.2   During the Cold War, the major powers used Olympic boycotts as a means 
                                                 
2 Congressional-Executive Commission on China. “The Beijing Olympics and Human Rights,” 
November 18, 2002. 
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to send an international message.  The two most publicized boycotts were of the 1980 
Moscow and the 1984 Los Angeles Games.  On a much smaller scale, North Korea sent a 
powerful message during the Seoul Olympics when it refused to participate. 
The 1988 Seoul Games were symbolically opened by 76-year-old Korean Sohn 
Kee-chung, who won the marathon in 1936, but who was forced to compete in the Games 
under a Japanese name since Korea was still occupied by Japan.3  The most dramatic 
moments of the Seoul Games, however, happened before the opening ceremony. When 
South Korea was awarded the Games, North Korea tried to make them an issue of unity.  
Pyongyang demanded a half share in the Games.  The official IOC policy had always 
been that the Games are awarded to a city and not a nation and therefore did not 
immediately support joint Games.  After international pressure, however, the president of 
the IOC asked Seoul if it would be willing to share the Games.  Seoul agreed only to a 
limited sharing of the Games, as it had been the city awarded the bid and had already 
begun construction programs.  Pyongyang would not accept anything less than half 
billing and was therefore denied hosting duties.  As a result, North Korea boycotted the 
Games. It was joined by Cuba, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.4 
Ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States were 
already a source of tension leading up to the Moscow Games in 1980.  With the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the tensions came to a head.  President Carter issued an 
ultimatum: if Soviet troops did not withdraw from Afghanistan by February 1980, the 
United States would boycott the Moscow Games.  The American boycott was officially 
announced in March 1980. 
A total of 36 nations officially refused the IOC invitation to the Moscow Games.  
Sixteen nations allowed their athletes to compete under the Olympic flag, but would not 
allow their national flag at the Games.  The largest nations that participated in the ban 
were the People’s Republic of China, West Germany, and Japan.5  The success of the 
                                                 
3 International Olympic Committee. Olympic Games, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/Games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=1&OLGY=1988, February 23, 2008. 
4 Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, 
and Controversies that Shaped the Games (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999), 226. 
5 Ibid., 183. 
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American boycott was limited, as the Soviet Union did not change its policies or 
behavior.  The boycott made a grand public statement, but it may have been more 
effective had the United States attempted its boycott earlier in the Games’ planning 
stages.  Additionally, the IOC never threatened to move the Games to another city.  An 
Olympic boycott must be credibly attached with a loss of income in order for the host 
nation to take it seriously.  In the event that a city has spent billions of dollars leading up 
to the Games, it would not want to see its efforts wasted by boycott or relocation.     
Most observers agree that one of the consequences of the American boycott of the 
1980 Games was the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Games.6  Leading up to the 
Los Angeles Games, the Soviet team constantly complained about the costs, the natural 
environment, and the political atmosphere in Los Angeles.  Additionally, Washington 
would not guarantee the return of Soviet defectors.  Ultimately, the Soviets declined to 
attend for reasons of “safety.”7  The Soviet boycott was significantly less successful than 
the American one four years before, as few nations joined Moscow.   
2. Historical Impact 
Three cities that I examine in this section had similar goals when they were 
selected as host cities.  Tokyo, Moscow, and Seoul each hoped to bring international 
recognition to its nation.  Of these host nations, Japan and South Korea successfully used 
the Games as their opportunity to re-emerge as a world power.  While Russia was already 
recognized as a world power, the Moscow Games which were moderately successful but 
soured by the American boycott. 
In a symbolic gesture, the Olympic torch for the Tokyo Games was lit by 
Yoshinori Sakai, who was born in Hiroshima on the day the atomic bomb was dropped.8  
Tokyo’s first attempt at hosting the Olympic Games had been 1940.  It won the bid to 
                                                 
6 Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, 
and Controversies that Shaped the Games (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999), 196-198. 
7 Ibid., 185. 
8 International Olympic Committee. Olympic Games, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/Games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=1&OLGY=1964, March 3, 2008. 
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host those Games, but after the Japanese military invaded China in 1937, the IOC moved 
the Games to Helsinki. With the outbreak of World War II, the Games were canceled.9  
Japan hoped that the 1964 Tokyo Games would mark its re-emergence as a fully 
sovereign and legitimate member of the international community.  Ninety-three nations 
competed in the Tokyo Games--a total of over 5,000 athletes in 163 events.10  The Tokyo 
Games created little controversy and were supported by both of the Cold War 
superpowers.  They were hailed as a great success and provided a model for future 
nations when staging the Games. 
As previously stated, the Moscow Games did not meet with such fanfare.  While 
they marked the first time a communist nation hosted the Olympics, the event was not 
well attended. While only 80 nations opted to attend, there were over 5,000 members of 
the press.11  Freedom of the press was limited in Moscow.  Some journalists at the time 
stated that they were threatened with deportation and followed by the KGB, while others 
stated that they found a comfortable environment. The Soviet Union defended its security 
measures as required for the safety of the athletes, the press, and tourists.12  Nevertheless, 
the increased exposure to Western society and open communication with outside nations 
could have resulted in furthering democratic goals within the Soviet Union.  reasoning 
that light, the American boycott may have wasted an opportunity to advance progressive 
political goals. 
3. Political Impact 
The Olympics have had wide-ranging political impact, both positive and negative.  
The two most dramatic events to which the Olympic Games have been seen as a catalyst  
                                                 
9 International Olympic Committee. Full Story, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/news/olympic_news/full_story_uk.asp?id=2158, March 3, 2008. 
10 International Olympic Committee. Olympic Games, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/Games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=1&OLGY=1964, March 3, 2008. 
11 International Olympic Committee. Olympic Games, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/Games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=1&OLGY=1980, March 3, 2008. 
12 Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, 
and Controversies that Shaped the Games (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999), 184. 
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are the democratization of South Korea and the end of Apartheid in South Africa.  
Questions remain as to how essential the Games were to these events, but there is little 
doubt that they influenced both outcomes. 
In the case of South Africa, Apartheid banned black athletes from competing on 
the same teams as white athletes.  As such, the Olympic athletes from South Africa were 
all white even though the majority of the nation was black.  South African athletes were 
first denied access to the Games in 1968.  Douglas Booth and Richard E. Lapchick 
examine the impact of the boycott in separate articles. 
Booth argues that the initial boycott in the 1960s was successful due to its limited 
goal—to desegregate sport in South Africa.  Under international pressure and boycott, 
South Africa sanctioned multi-racial sport.  The sport boycott then shifted goals which, 
ultimately, made it less effective.  In the 1970s, it attempted the more broad social change 
of ending apartheid in its entirety.  Toward this end, it enforced a blanket boycott on 
South African teams participating in international sport.  Booth maintains that the blanket 
boycott, if applied selectively, would have produced more relevant results.  While some 
South African teams were willing to integrate if they were given permission to compete 
internationally, they were not provided the opportunity.  Removing this incentive also 
removed competition to desegregate more quickly.  If certain teams had been allowed to 
compete outside of South Africa, it may have led the others to desegregate towards the 
same honor.  Booth concludes that the sport boycott could have been a successful use of 
international pressure had it been applied with consistent and achievable goals.13   
Similarly, Richard Lapchick concludes that the use of sport politics alone is not 
enough to change the cultural and historical underpinnings of apartheid.  He argues that 
while a positive gesture, agreeing to multiracial sport at the international level did little to 
improve conditions on the small scale in South Africa.  In other words, Pretoria was 
willing to desegregate to end South Africa’s status as an international sports pariah, but it  
 
 
                                                 
13Douglas Booth, “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott.” The 
Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 38, No. 3. (Jul. 2003), 477-493. 
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was not willing to desegregate at the club and city levels of sport.  Lapchick concludes 
that domestic change must start small scale and rise to the international level instead of 
being imposed by outside forces.14  
In the case of South Korea, the impact of the Olympics is far more clear.  Jarol B. 
Manheim describes the Seoul Olympics as “public diplomacy”—a method by which one 
nation seeks to employ the media and public opinion to bring political pressure on 
another nation.  While it is possible for a host nation to use this media attention in its 
favor, it is also difficult to control such a high profile event.  “In this context, it might be 
useful to view the Olympics as a highly dramatic, highly visible, quasi-historical, 
intermediate-length event which possesses a sufficient dynamic of its own, under certain 
circumstances, to overwhelm those who control it.”15  The ability of a host nation to 
control both domestic and international media may influence the extent to which 
international public opinion will be focused on the host nation.  In the case of South 
Korea, the Western media acted as a catalyst for democratic change in the months leading 
up to the Seoul Games.  
David R. Black and Shona Bezanson also use the Seoul Games as a predictive 
tool for the possible impact of future Games.  They specifically address the impact the 
Games might have had on the PRC.  Their comparison between the two nations is based 
largely on the lack of human rights and the abundance of nationalism and pride via sport 
which was present before the Games.  While they concede that the international context 
is now vastly different, they believe positive outcomes in Beijing may be predicted by the 
democratization of South Korea.  “While… ‘regime change’ is not likely, an enhanced 





                                                 
14 Richard E. Lapchick, “South Africa: Sport and Apartheid Politics.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 445. (Sep. 1979), 155-165. 
15 Jarol B. Manheim, “Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy.” The 
Western Political Quarterly. Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jun. 1990), 279-295. 
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inflected through distinctive Chinese institutional forms, could be.  At the very least, 
tactical concessions are probable… offering new spaces and opportunities for social 
mobilisation to emerge.”16 
The 1988 Seoul Olympics combined domestic political agitation with a setting of 
intense international attention.  Domestic political turmoil and public protests easily 
became international news.  Protesters were demanding restoration of democratic 
political processes suspended in 1961 under former President Pak Chung-hui.  In this 
context, the IOC pressured South Korea to end the turmoil or risk losing the Olympic 
Games to another city.  In order to avoid the embarrassment of losing the Games, the 
government bowed to domestic pressure and restored democratic processes.17 
4. Beijing – Selection Process and Controversy 
Many question Beijing’s selection as an Olympic host city.  China faces 
environmental and human rights issues, which some argued would be exacerbated by the 
hosting of the Olympic Games.  Among these issues are water availability and air quality 
concerns. One-third of China’s population lacks clean drinking water, with the per capita 
water supply only one quarter of the global average.18  The problem is made worse by the 
pollution of 70 percent of China’s rivers, 80 percent of whose major tributaries no longer 
support fish.19  This vast pollution is the result of 200 million tons of sewage and 
industrial waste being dumped into the rivers in 2004.20  China’s lack of water increased 
as the Olympics approached.  The water consumption during the Games was expected to 
increase by 30 percent. The Beijing Olympics worsened the problem by redirecting water 
                                                 
16 David R. Black and Shona Bezanson, “The Olympic Games, Human Rights, and Democratisation: 
Lessons from Seoul and Implications for Beijing.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 25, No. 7. (2004), 1245-
1261. 
17 Charles K. Armstrong, Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 58. 
18 “Environmental Performance Review of China: Conclusions and Recommendations.” OECD.org, 
October 21, 2007, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/23/37657409.pdf 
19 Cynthia W. Cann, Michael C. Cann and Gao Shangquan, “China’s Road to Sustainable 
Development,” in China’s Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development ed. Kristen A. Day 
(Armonk, New York: Columbia University, 2005), 6. 
20 Carin Zissis, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” CFR.org, October 21, 2007. 
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from Shaanxi and Hebei provinces.  These two regions, already dry, were required to 
pump clean water to Beijing in time for the Olympics.21     
In preparation for the Olympics in Beijing, a spotlight was also placed on the 
city’s air quality. The European Satellite Agency published a report in September 2005 
listing Beijing as having the world's highest levels of nitrogen dioxide, a smog gas 
originating from power plants, heavy industry and vehicle emissions.  This gas can cause 
fatal lung damage and was found to have increased by 50 percent in China's air since 
1996.22 
In an effort to combat these gases, and improve air quality for the athletes, 100 
factories have been relocated outside of Beijing.  Additionally, 30,000 taxis have been 
replaced with less polluting vehicles.23  Even with these measures, air quality in the city 
was only considered “good” two thirds of the year in 2006.24   
There were also human rights issues.  One was violence in Tibet.  Western reports 
coming from China are varied, but reporters agree that the Chinese military and police 
used harsh methods to suppress the Tibetan protesters.  Estimates of those killed by both 
sides range from 22 to 140.25  The PRC also censored foreign press coverage of the 
episode.  An American documentary crew was forcibly removed from its hotel and sent 
to film in a new location to prevent it from filming the violence in the region.26 
5. Elements of Soft Power 
The force of the Olympic Games as a medium of political influence in 
international relations is as an aspect of “soft power.”  Joseph Nye defines “soft power” 
                                                 
21 “Olympics ‘Threat to Water Supply,” CNN.com, February 27, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7266681.stm 
22 Antoaneta Bezlova, “China: Race to Improve Air Quality for 2008 Olympics,” IPSnews, December 
4, 2007, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32097. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Carin Zissis, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” CFR.org, October 21, 2007. 
25 “Tibet Speaker: Dalai Lama Not Behind Riots,” CNN.com, March 30, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/30/china.tibet.ap/index.html. 
26 “American Film Crew Kept from China Protests,” CNN.com, March 17, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/17/tibet.american/. 
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as the ability of one country to get “other countries to want what it wants.”27  According 
to Nye, soft power relies not on the threats and coercion of hard power, but instead 
provides incentives for cooperation.  It relies on the power of shared ideas to make 
policies seem legitimate.  The core of soft power is the ability to influence opinion based 
on shared culture, institutions, and ideology.  In order to make use of soft power, policy 
makers must be able to influence other nations at this core.   
Another aspect of successful use of soft culture, according to Nye, is the 
“universality of culture.”28  In this context, it is not necessarily the common aspects of a 
nation’s cultural history that define shared ideology, but the attractiveness of a single 
nation’s culture.  According to this theory, when non-American citizens buy American 
clothes, music, or food products, it increases America’s soft power by increasing interest 
in its culture.  The more attractive a nation finds your culture, the more likely it is to 
cooperate at the institutional level. 
Nye further explains that soft power is essential to the survival of the hegemony 
of the United States.  He states that Washington is in danger of squandering the soft 
power gains made through increased universality of American culture by acting too 
independently and arrogantly on the world stage.  This impact can be lessened when the 
United States exercises restraint in using its power in regards to its allies.  American 
restraint contributes to its soft power by providing incentive for other nations to 
cooperate with the United States. 29 
In reviewing Nye’s work, Peter J. Spiro agrees with Nye’s assessment of 
American soft power.  “In the short run, foreign policy will continue to be contested 
largely through traditional governmental channels.  In the long run, the mechanisms of 
global governance may render the very notion of foreign policy an artifact of a particular 
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stage of historical development.”30  In other words, soft power as a tool of foreign policy 
will eventually become obsolete, but it is currently the best solution available.  Spiro 
believes that Nye’s practical application of soft power presents the most plausible and 
effective foreign policy solution. 
Another explanation of power, as offered by Niall Ferguson, places an emphasis 
on the material aspects of power.  He refutes Nye’s claims that an attractive culture could 
cause other nations to conduct more favorable relations with the United States.  He cites 
the example of British colonies in the 19th century.  They were the most anglicized of 
these colonies which were the first to revolt against British Rule.  This leads Ferguson to 
conclude that soft power is in fact too soft to be effective.31  His argument is limited to 
these colonies and thus has limited support.  His explanation of soft power is given at the 
individual level and is therefore of little application to arguments at the state level.  
While it is a challenge to deploy the idea of soft power in actual policy making, it 
is my contention that the Olympics provide an ideal opportunity to do so.  It is essential 
that the international community engage the PRC on questions of human rights, security, 
and economic stability.  It is rare to have the ideal set of circumstances to magnify the 
impact of public diplomacy to this scale and it is important that the opportunity not be 
wasted.  
6. Future Olympic Host Cities 
The next three post-Beijing Olympic cities have already been selected: the 2010 
winter Games in Vancouver, the 2012 summer Games in London, and the 2014 winter 
Games in Sochi, Russia.  While the Vancouver Games will be the third Olympics hosted 
by Canada, it is the first in the province of British Columbia, and it is already not without 
controversy.32 Opposition to the 2010 Vancouver Games has already been expressed by 
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hundreds of activists and politicians.  The estimated taxpayer expense to host the Games 
is two billion Canadian dollars and expected to increase.33  The construction is also 
anticipated to cause a loss of affordable housing.   
The 2012 London Games have so far been met with significantly less controversy.  
London will be the first city to have host the modern Games of three Olympiads, and it 
remains the only city in the United Kingdom to host them.34  Having been the victim of 
terrorist attacks in the recent past, it will fight hard to prevent becoming a symbol for 
fanatics.  Security is expected to be its foremost concern.  In addition, London already 
faces serious congestion that will only increase, with attendant environmental impact of 
hosting the Games. 
The next city to host is the most unexpected.  Sochi is a small Russian resort town 
on the northwestern coast of the Black Sea.  Since this is Russia's first time hosting the 
Winter Olympics, it will be a major event.  Additionally, $580 million will be spent on 
construction and modernization of telecommunications in the region.  By 2011, there will 
be construction and improvement of four power stations and four cascaded hydroelectric 
power stations with total output of 1129 MW. The cost of operating these plants is 
expected to be approximately 83.6 billion rubles ($3.2 billion).  A further 115 billion 
rubles are expected to be spent on the transportation infrastructure.35  
While this will create a marked improvement in the area’s infrastructure as a 
whole, it is still controversial.  A minority ethnic group in this region--the Circassians--is 
a small group, but they point out that the 2014 Olympic Games will mark the 150th 
anniversary of the Circassians’ defeat by Russia in 1864.36  Many would phrase this 
defeat as genocide.  Circassians further note that the Russian Government currently bans 
and prevents local inhabitants from visiting many of the tourist and mountainous areas of 
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the region that they live in.  Many of these areas are also protected as a United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites.  
This will be the first time in history that Olympic facilities have been approved to be built 
on natural UNESCO World Heritage sites.37 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The use of the Olympic Games as a tool for soft power presents an ideal 
opportunity for a case study.  Taking a historical and political approach to the study of 
the Olympics, this thesis focuses on the selection process, economic impact, national and 
international consequences, as well as an overal impact on human rights.  It not only 
focuses on the impact of national policy changes, but on the opinion and actions of the 
international community in providing a catalyst for national political change. 
Materials for this research include books, press reports, and journals.  Secondary 
sources provide a historical account of political change, requirements for hosting, and 
financial and environmental consequences caused by Olympic Games.  Primary sources 
evaluate the impact of the Beijing Games on China.  They also detail the opinion of the 
international community and subsequent policy change in China.   
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II. HISTORICAL BASIS FOR EXPECTATION OF CHANGE 
A. IMPORTANCE TO HOST NATION 
The International Olympic Committee’s longevity is due to its ability to convince 
cities that the bid, and subsequent acceptance of the Games, benefits both the nation and 
the host city.  The IOC suggests that a host nation will see improvements in its economy, 
national pride, and environmental health.38  The actual result, however, has often been 
mixed and difficult to measure.   
1. Economic 
The majority of Olympic Bid and Planning Committees use the possible 
economic benefits as the impetus to host the Olympic Games.  These committees use this 
argument to convince citizens that the initial cost of the Games will be offset by the 
income created by construction, tourism, and advertising during the Games.  The IOC is 
not responsible for any of the costs incurred by the host city in executing the Olympics.39  
As such, the citizens of each city will see a tax increase as well as a depletion of public 
funds in reserve. 
Simply applying to bid for the Games cost a nation’s Olympic committee 
$150,000.40  Once a bid is accepted, the nominated city must create a bid package which 
includes plans for infrastructure, security, environmental protection, Olympic theme, and 
citizen opinions.  Each of these reports is generated at the city’s expense.  In addition to 
the official costs of the bid process, most nations spend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in “extra” expenses to help convince members of the International Olympic Committee 
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that its candidate city is the best.  With the overall cost of hosting the Games now 
exceeding the two billion dollar mark41, citizens are wondering how public funds will be 
replenished once the Games have ended.  Most economic impact plans lay out three ways 
in which income will be generated as a result of hosting a mega-sporting event: 
infrastructure improvement, income from tourism, and corporate sponsorship.42 
First, the IOC may suggest that a city’s infrastructure be greatly improved.  In 
order to be accepted for a bid, a city must have sound sports and housing facilities, as 
well as a functioning system of transportation.43  In cities where these services already 
exist, the improvement cost is limited and may lead to much needed revitalization of 
certain areas of the city.  In cities where these services do not exist, such as Beijing, the 
cost of creating this infrastructure is staggering. 
It was estimated that investments on venues and non-sports infrastructure in 
Beijing would be $14 billion.44  The amount that Beijing spent on new venues for the 
Games was significantly higher than any previous Olympic event.  This can partially be 
explained by the city’s lack of development in comparison to previous host cities such as 
Atlanta, Moscow, and Los Angeles.  Of the total infrastructure improvements, 
approximately 13 percent is estimated to have beem spent on sports venues and the 
Olympic Village.  Of the 37 planned facilities, 16 were new and 18 required updates.  
Nearly two-thirds of Beijing’s Olympic budget was slated to go towards environmental 
protection. These funds were applied in the areas of air quality, water conservation, waste 
disposal, clean energy development, and "greening up" of the landscape. Transportation 
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improvements were included as part of the environmental improvements, as they 
intended to expand public transportation and convert buses to clean energy prior to the 
Games.45  
The Moscow Games had approximately a quarter of the 300,000 expected visitors. 
The cost of improving the infrastructure in preparation for these visitors was not detailed 
outside of the Soviet Union.  Infrastructure improvements included Lenin Stadium, 69 other 
sports facilities, construction of hotels and the improvement of the Metro System.  At the 
time, Moscow mayor Vladimir F. Promyslov stated that the city had spent "about $ 2 billion 
on the Games."46  
In contrast, the Los Angeles Games made over $200 million.  The Los Angeles 
Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) relied on existing facilities and therefore 
constructed very little.  Much of its success can also be attributed to the over $700 million 
received from television rights, commercial sponsorship and ticket sales.  The total cost of 
the Games was $500 million.47   
The total cost of the Seoul Games was nearly $4 billion.  The initial profit was 
calculated at $139 million.  That figure rises to almost $500 million when apartment sales of 
Olympic Housing are factored in. 48 
Second, the income generated from tourism is extensive.  Between the estimated 
580,000 journalists and spectators who were expected to attend the  Beijing Games, the 
city hoped to see millions of dollars injected back into the city’s economy.49  Had 
controversy or serious tragedy occurred during the Games, these numbers would have 
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fallen drastically.  Relying on money from tourism leaves much of the efforts to recover 
the Olympic investment to chance and an increased security budget.   
Tourism during the Games is no indication of continued tourism, however.  
Beijing attempted to encourage long-term tourism by improving both the environment 
and communications technology available within the city. In 2004, Beijing boasted 458 
hotels with 84,812 rooms.  The goal was to ensure that there would be "so many hotel 
rooms that tourists visiting the city will have no trouble finding a place that suits their 
specific needs".  In order to attain that goal by 2008, Beijing planned to have 800 hotels 
with 130,000 rooms.50  If the growth of tourism does not match the growth of 
development for tourism, the cost of development will not be recouped.  It is probable 
that any positive image garnered from the Games will lead to an increase in long term 
tourism.  In fact, domestic tourism to Beijing has already increased since the end of the 
Games.51   
Finally, the most easily measured economic benefit of the Olympics are corporate 
sponsorship and media rights.  Any items that do not bear the Olympic logo may not be 
seen at the Games.52  The income generated from these marketed items will be returned 
to the city.  It is essential that the logo and mascots for the Games are attractive for the 
public and not readily counterfeited, in order for a city to achieve a profitable event.  The 
Beijing Olympic Committee stated that the cost of the Beijing Olympics would be 
covered entirely by marketing costs. 
Media coverage of the event is highly sought after in the lead up to the Games.  
Broadcasting companies from each nation must negotiate to obtain a contract to distribute 
the Games from the IOC.  While the IOC was expected to receive 1.7 billion dollars for 
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broadcasting rights,53 the host nation can only hope for positive coverage, which can lead 
to greater long-term tourism and foreign investment. 
The true economic impact of the Beijing Games will not be seen for several years.  
Analysts must have time to measure the utility of the newly formed infrastructure and the 
increase in tourism over time.  If previous Olympic Games are any indication, there is a 
strong likelihood that the massive cost of the Beijing Olympics will be recouped not by 
infrastructure improvements or an increase in foreign tourists, but the income generated 
from succesful marketing. 
2. Nationalism 
As previously discussed, many nations use the Olympics as a boost to individual 
patriotism, national pride, and international image.  While this is a sentiment which the 
IOC encourages, it directly counters its stated desire for apolitical sporting events.  When 
a nation uses athletes to prove superiority over other nations, it is simply politics, or 
warfare, by other means.  Some believe that if the Games were truly separate from 
national politics, the medalists would not stand beneath the nation’s flag to receive their 
medals.54   
Having said that, one must ask how much the Olympic Games contribute to 
national pride.  According to those who sought to boycott the 1936 Berlin Games, it can 
be a major factor.  Hitler sought to glorify his improved “Aryan nation” by successfully 
hosting the Olympic Games.  Germany won a staggering 89 medals with the United 
States coming in second with only 56.  The success of Germany’s athletes was hailed as a 
testament to the superiority of his Aryan athletes.55  In hindsight, this was a great failure 
on the part of the Olympic committee to remove the nomination from a host city.  The 
success of the Berlin Games increased German nationalism to extremely high levels and 
added credence to Hitler’s plan for a master race. 
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Nationalism can be seen in a more positive light.  The 1960 Tokyo Games were 
hailed as the evidence that Japan and her people had not only recovered from the events 
of World War II, but excelled in its aftermath.  It marked the first Olympics to be 
awarded to an Asian nation.56  While Japanese athletes came in a far third in the medal 
count behind the United States and the Soviet Union, the Games were still a success.  
These Games marked the first sporting event to be broadcast live across the Pacific.57 
When Beijing was awarded the Games in 2001, a massive celebration was held in 
Tiananmen Square.  President Jiang Zemin told the crowd of tens of thousands that, 
“Winning the host rights means winning the respect, trust, and favor of the international 
community.”58  The Games provided China’s leaders with an opportunity to show the 
nation’s rise as a great power, but also a peaceful one.  
Since China was awarded the Games, international criticism has been voiced 
loudly via a variety of media outlets.  The outcome was not a nation which bowed to 
pressure, but one that is indignant at being judged by Western media.  On April 19th 
approximately 2,000 Chinese citizens took to the streets in several cities to chant patriotic 
slogans.59  As a result of continued support for the Dalai Lama, the willingness of 
president Nicolas Sarkozy to boycott the Games, and the treatemnet of the Olympic torch 
bearer,  France has come under a great deal of fire.  In fact the French retail chain, 
Carrefour, was been threatened with boycott following the poor treatment of the Olympic 
torch bearer in Paris.60 
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3. Environmental 
Beijing saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to make the city more 
“green.”61  Beijing’s current environmental situation is so grim that many athletes were 
concerned for their respiratory health while competing.  In fact, members of the 
American cycling team arrived in Beijing wearing protective safety masks.62  
According to the Beijing Olympic Committee, ensuring that the Olympics were 
green was one of its top priorities.63  Environmental protection is a key prerequisite for 
designing and constructing the Olympic Games' facilities, while strict ecological 
standards and systematic guarantee systems were established.  They promised to 
concentrate on urban and rural afforestation and environmental protection, as well as 
promote awareness among the general public.  Additionally, they encouraged citizens and 
visitors to make environmentally sound consumption choices to “help better the capital's 
ecological standards and build a city better fit for all to enjoy.”64 
B. HISTORY OF CONTROVERSY 
1. Selection Process 
The Olympic Games in Salt Lake City brought to light many illegal practices that 
nations were using in order to persuade the IOC to accept their bids.  It was found that 
officials were receiving bribes in the form of lavish dinners, all-expense paid family 
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vacations, and the tuition of children.65  While the Salt Lake City Games were a shining 
example of corruption, this was not the first or last instance of buying favor during the 
selection process.   
As a result of this scandal, the IOC completely changed the bidding process in 
order to curtail future abuses. The bid now consists of a two-phase process which takes 
approximately two years.  During the first phase, application, the city requesting to stage 
the Games must be put forward to the IOC by its National Olympic Committee via letter.  
After which the city becomes an “applicant city.”  Each city will remain an applicant for 
roughly ten months.  During which time, they are required to answer a questionnaire 
which provides the IOC with the city’s plan to host the Olympic Games.66   
Once these questionaires are reviewed, the IOC will release the list of “Candidate 
Cities.”  The candidate cities proceed to phase two.  At this point, the cities must submit a 
candidature file and a site inspection will be conducted by the IOC.  The IOC Executive 
Board will then create a list of finalist cities for the vote.  Members of the voting 
committee are encouraged to make their assessment of the host city’s ability to host the 
Games based on the candidature file vice personal feelings or favors received.67 
The more controlled process did not prevent French President, Jacques Chirac, 
from expending more than 30 million dollars in order to secure the 2012 Games for 
Paris.68  Even though this sum is vast, it did not guarantee the French Bid.  The Games 
were awarded to London.  In a world of elitism and politics via sport, it is no surprise that 
many suspect the close ties of the United States and England to have been the deciding 
factor in awarding the 2012 Games. 
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2. Environmental Impact 
The environmental impact of the Olympic Games is largely dependent on two 
factors.   First, the amount of infrastructure that must be built to host the Games.  If a city 
already has adequate housing and sporting venues, construction will be minimal.  
Additionally, if the transportation system is sufficient to handle the thousands of tourists, 
athletes, and journalists who will decend upon the city, limited transportation 
construction will be required.   
The next major contributor to environmental impact is the increase of people 
within the city.  The addition of thousands of people significantly increases water 
consumption, waste production, and carbon dioxide emissions within the city.  In a city 
like Beijing, which is already overcrowded, these increases further deteriorate a grim air 
and water quality situation.  
In order to mitigate these concerns, China’s Olympic Committee took many steps 
to improve the environment in Beijing and other cities in which events are being 
conducted.  First, all vending machines provided by Coca Cola for the Games contained 
natural refridgerants which did not contain hydroflourocarbons.  These systems improved 
the efficiency of each vending machine by 30 percent.69  
As the Olympics in Beijing approached, a spotlight was placed on the city’s air 
quality. The European Satellite Agency published a report in September 2005, listing 
Beijing as having the world's highest levels of nitrogen dioxide, a smog gas originating 
from power plants, heavy industry and vehicle emissions.  This gas can cause fatal lung 
damage and was found to have increased by 50 percent in China's air since 1996.70 
In an effort to combat these gases, and improve air quality for the athletes, 100 
factories have been relocated outside of Beijing.  Additionally, 30,000 taxis have been 
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replaced with less polluting vehicles.71  Even with these measures, air quality in the city 
was only considered “good” two-thirds of the year in 2006.72 
C. UNSUCCESSFUL USE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE 
1. Melbourne, 1956 
In 1956, the Summer Olympics were held in Melbourne, Australia.  Many nations 
attempted to use the Games as an opportunity to make political statements. Egypt, Iraq, 
and Lebanon refused to participate in response to the Suez War.  They did not want to 
share an event with Israel, the United Kingdom, and France after those nations staged an 
invasion of Egypt.  In addition, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland withdrew from 
the Games in order to protest the Soviet response to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. 
Finally, the People’s Republic of China boycotted the Games when the Republic of China 
was allowed to compete as “Formosa.”73   
Amid all of this political turmoil, Avery Brudage (President of the IOC, 1952-
1972) insisted that the Games would proceed as planned.  The IOC went further in 
censoring those nations who refused to participate in the Melbourne Games, “The 
International Olympic Committee, an organization concerned only with sports, expresses 
its sadness and regret at the abstentions, which it considers contrary to the Olympic 
ideals.”74  While the Melbourne Olympics were generally considered a success, the 
boycotting nations reduced the number of participating athletes relative to the previous 
and successive Summer Games.  In 1952, Helsinki hosted 69 nations and 4,955  
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athletes.75  The 1960 Games, held in Rome boasted 83 nations and 5, 338 athletes.76  
While Melbourne’s 72 nations are approximately equal, the number of athletes was 
significantly lower at 3,314.77  
2.  Mexico City, 1968 
On October 2, 1968, more than 200 students were massacred by the Mexican 
military in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas, while thousands more were jailed.  The 
students were protesting social conditions in Mexico, as well as the $200 million price 
tag of the Olympic Games.  They were expecting to have an increase in publicity with 
which to push their issues, instead they found themselves being brutally silenced.  
Official reports at the time stated that only 30 killed and a few hundred injured.78 
Before the Games, several international conflicts impacted the athletes and 
planners of the event.  First, the IOC Executive Board recommended that the invitatation 
to compete in the Games be revoked from South Africa, as a result of their continued 
policy of apartheid.  Second, black athletes in America were threatening to compete 
under a new flag, vice the American flag.   
Following the assasination of Martin Luther King, Jr., a group led by Harry 
Edwards stated that, “We are not Americans, we are black people.”79  In a compromise, 
black athletes agreed to stand under the American flag, but still make a statement 
regarding race if they were to win.  The lesser known of these statements was to wear 
black gloves in the event that they had to shake the hand of Avery Brundage.80 They felt 
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was a racist based on his consistent support for Hitler’s Berlin Games, as well as the 
segregated South African team.   These black gloves were made famous when Tommie 
Smith and John Carlos wore them to demonstrate the black power salute following the 
200-meter event. Brundage suspended Smith and Carlos from the U.S. team and banned 
them from the Olympic Village, but the Games continued as planned.81 
3.  Montreal, 1976 
Twenty-eight African nations boycotted the 1976 Summer Olympics held in 
Montreal.  The boycott came following the IOC’s refusal to ban New Zealand from 
participating in the Games.  Earlier that year, New Zealand’s all black rugby team toured 
apartheid ruled South Africa, who was still banned from competing in IOC hosted 
events.82   Both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China boycotted the 
Games since each nation wanted the IOC to respect their legitimacy.83  Again, the 
success of the 1976 Olympics were relatively unaffected by these controversies. 
4.  Moscow, 1980 
The Moscow Games were marred by the largest single boycott in Olympic 
history.  The United States led 36 nations in refusing to attend the 1980 Games. The 
boycott was in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.  Some athletes 
competed under an Olympic vice national flag in order to participate in the Games.84   
The American-led boycott was met with mixed success.  While the message of 
disapproval for Soviet actions was clear, Soviet troops did not leave Afghanistan and the  
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Russians went on to break multiple world and Olympic records.85  Even though they had 
just been readmitted into the International Olympic Committee, the PRC also chose to 
join the American boycott.86 
5.  Los Angeles, 1984 
In response to the American led boycott of the Moscow Games, the Soviet Union 
led a boycott of her allies.  These nations stated that they could not attend based on  
security concerns amid an anti-Soviet Union environment.87   Even amidst this 
international turbulence, the Los Angeles Games proceeded and made a profit of 215 
million dollars.88 
D. SUCCESSFUL USE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE 
1.  Seoul 
The only Olympic Games in which international political pressure directly 
impacted the method by which a nation was governed occurred in 1988. Massive student 
protests led many in the IOC to seek to send the Olympic Games to a new city.  In order 
to prevent the embarrassment and financial waste that would be associated with losing 
the Games, the government appeared to give in to the protesters.  In an unprecedented 
move by an Olympic Host Nation, democracy was established just before the 1988 Seoul 
Games.89   
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What is neglected in this brief synopsis are the many other preconditions that 
were present in South Korea, which led to a shift to democracy.  First, the move was not 
entirely peaceful.  Some students reported being clubbed and imprisoned by South 
Korean forces.  Second, South Korea’s government was already in a state of transition 
following the awarding of the bid.  Before the student protests began, there was an 
assassination attempt on the president as well as a military coup.  Finally, the newly 
formed middle class had an increased desire for social change and freedom of expression.  
While the military run government was not completely opposed to change, they wanted it 
to come about in a gradual and controlled manner.90 
The conditions, which precipitated the South Korean shift to democracy, do not 
exist in China.  The Chinese government is not involved in a transition of leadership type.  
Additionally, the Chinese population is largely satisfied with their system of government 
and there is little widespread demand for change in Beijing.  Finally, the Chinese 
government is less seeking to prove their importance to the international community as to 
showcase it.91  For these reasons, it is unlikely that the massive political change in South 
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III.  THE 2008 OLYMPICS: WHY BEIJING? 
The selection of Beijing to host the 2008 Olympic Games was a controversial one.  
Beijing was initially denied the 2000 Games in the wake of the events at Tiananmen 
Square in 1989.92  The images of unarmed students and workers being killed by the 
Chinese military were too fresh in the eyes of the international community.  What 
changed in the following years to convince the International Olympic Committee that 
Beijing was now the right choice?  Both China’s position in the global community and 
the Olympic Committee’s vision for host cities. 
China is amongst the most rapidly growing economies in the world.  During the 
current global economic down turn, their massive reserves have allowed them to maintain 
a stable economy in turbulent times.93  In addition to its massive economic influence, 
China has become an influential member of the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization.  Diplomatically and economically, China is showing their ability to act as a 
world power.  Part of the goal of the Olympics is to increase a nation’s soft power.  In 
order to accomplish this, the nation’s culture and image must be attractive to other 
nations.  The areas in which China lacks this soft power provide the reasons for which 
Beijing’s selection as host city was contentious.  The following sections detail why 
Beijing was a controversial choice. 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
While China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased nearly eleven percent in 
2006, attempts to reverse ecosystem damage cost approximately nine percent of GDP.94  
Additionally, 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are in China.95  China continues to 
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seek economic growth and recognition in the world market, but they will not be able to 
sustain this level of growth if they are not able to stem the tide of pollution.  
1. Water Pollution 
One third of China’s population lacks clean drinking water, with the per capita 
water supply only one quarter of the global average.96  Exacerbating the problem is that 
70 percent of China’s rivers are polluted and 80 percent of its major tributaries no longer 
support fish.97  This vast pollution is the result of 200 million tons of sewage and 
industrial waste being dumped into the rivers in 2004.98  China’s lack of water is not just 
a result of pollution, but a geographic fact of life. The Northwest regions of China lack 
the lakes and rivers that flow through the rest of the nation.  In addition, they receive very 
little rain fall.  
In an attempt to combat the aridity in some regions of China, major projects have 
been undertaken to construct 25,000 dams.99  Sadly, these projects have done much more 
damage than China’s experts predicted, resulting in loss of farmland, ecological damage, 
and forced migration.  The most prominent example of this is the Three Gorges Dam 
Project.  In addition to providing irrigation for arid lands, it was intended to provide a 
reduction of flooding downstream, carbon free power, and a navigation friendly 
reservoir.100 
The Three Gorges Dam project is part of the South-North Water Transfer Project 
which, when complete in 2050, will consist of three water transfer lines: West (250 
miles), Middle (775 miles), and East (772 miles). Between these three lines, 44 billion 
cubic meters of water will be diverted to the North each year.  At a cost of 25 billion 
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dollars, it is the most ambitious dam project the world has ever seen.101  Since the 
construction began, 1.4 million people have been displaced and hundreds of thousands 
more are expected to be relocated because of erosion and landslides which have resulted 
in waves up to 165 feet.102 
2. Desertification 
China’s limited water supply will only grow worse as the desert continues to 
encroach on rural and urban areas.  Almost 6,000 square miles of grassland are lost each 
year as a result of excessive farm cultivation, especially over-grazing.103  Desertification 
is not just a concern for those without water or fertile land for agriculture. Desertification 
is the cause of one-third of China’s air pollution.  The arid lands have given rise to an 
unprecedented number of sandstorms.  One hundred sandstorms were expected between 
2000 and 2009.  This estimation is four times that of the previous decade.104 
 Many experts claim that eliminating sandstorms in China is impossible.  In April 
this year, Liu Tuo, Director of China’s National Bureau to Combat Desertification under 
the State Forestry Administration, stated that sand storms originate not just from 
desertified regions of northern China (1.74 million square kilometers), but also from 
foreign sand sources.  As such, technical conditions (interpreted as political concerns) 
prevent the reclamation of desertified lands.  He further states that, while the sandy days 
are more frequent this year than in years past, they are still within normal expected 
ranges.105  This resistance to accepting responsibility for desertified lands is 
characteristic of many nations attempting to pass blame to the international community. 
 The case of the Aibi Lake offers further evidence of desertification.  Once 1200 
square meters in size, Xinjiang’s largest salt lake has been reduced to only 500 square 
kilometers.  The drying of the lake has produced desert land surrounding the lake which 
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is expanding at the rate of approximately 40 square meters a year.  As the water in the 
lake evaporates, the salt content becomes more concentrated, meaning that less of the 
water can be used for irrigation or converted to drinking water.  Of 385 species of plants 
native to the lake, only 322 remain.  The sandstorm weather in this region has grown 
from 13 days in the 1960s, to 110 days a year.106 
3. Air Pollution 
As a result of air pollution, China has the highest occurrence of respiratory illness 
of any nation in the world. The leading causes of air pollution in China are automobile 
traffic, coal, and desertification.  Since desertification is addressed above, I will only 
discuss the current impact of traffic and coal burning in this section.  The quality of fuel 
in China’s passenger vehicles is low, meaning that it is high in sulfur content that leads to 
acid rain.  There are 16 million cars currently on China’s roads, and the number of 
vehicles on the road has doubled since 2000.  Conversely, the number of bike routes has 
decreased to make room for more roads and the efficiency of public transportation has 
been reduced.107 
China is expected to become the world’s largest consumer of energy by 2010.108  
Coal is China’s primary energy source, providing more than two-thirds of China’s 
energy.  Since it is the cheapest source of fuel, it is difficult to convince energy 
companies to convert to fuel sources with a smaller carbon footprint.  Coal produces 
sulfur dioxide which results in acid rain.  Currently acid rain falls on 30% of China.109  
At the current rate of coal consumption, China is expected to become the largest emitter 
of greenhouse gases by 2009.110  
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4. Social Results of Pollution 
In the village of Daqing, ten children, from a population of less than 4,000, have 
been born with Minamata Syndrome, which was misdiagnosed as cerebral palsy by local 
doctors.  Since this kind of clustering is not usual with cerebral palsy, it was determined 
that the children were suffering from Minamata Syndrome, as a result of mercury 
exposure in the womb.  The Hongwei Petrochemical Park is located just outside of 
Daqing.  In 2003, the local government acknowledged the disease was a result of 
pollution and promised to relocate the villagers to a less dangerous location.  As of 
September 29, 2007, no villagers had been relocated.111 
In another example of industry poisoning a village, the very small town of 
Liangqiao has come to be known as a “cancer village.”  Cancer has become the leading 
cause of death in China. The cancer rate is 137 in 100,000 people.  In the town of 
Liangquiao, this number is much higher. Twenty-eight people, in a village that is only 
400 strong, have died of cancer in the last ten years.  The villagers claim that the high 
cancer rate is due to the untreated water that flows from an iron-ore mine 35 miles 
upstream.  The water used by the villagers for irrigating their crops comes from this river, 
which is high in arsenic and cadmium.  Doctors have advised citizens to move, but many 
cannot afford to do so.112 
B. HUMAN RIGHTS 
1. Beijing’s Promises 
When the Olympic Games were awarded to China, Beijing’s Vice Mayor, Liu 
Jingmin, stated that Beijing wanted the Games ”to promote not just the city's 
development, but the development of society, including democracy and human rights.”113  
In the weeks following the Olympic Games, it is clear that these promises were not kept.  
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In hindsight, it is easy to say that the IOC should have realized that the Olympics could 
not change the human rights abuses rife in a government with a weak judicial system.  If 
there is no enforcement, there can be little hope of improvement.  Even so, the IOC 
hoped that their involvement would lead to an improvement in human rights.114  
Major areas in which China lacks basic human rights are press freedom, the death 
penalty, and arbitrary detention. As part of their Olympic Bid, the Beijing Olympic 
Committee submitted a package that included promises to improve human rights.  While 
the Host City Contract detailing these promises has not been released to the public, there 
were several areas where Beijing ensured improvement: “use of the death penalty; 
arbitrary detention; abusive forms of administrative detention; the arbitrary detention, 
imprisonment, ill-treatment and harassment of human rights defenders, including 
journalists and lawyers; and the censorship of the internet.”115 
In preparation for the Olympic Games, two elderly women, Wu Dianyuan and 
Wang Xiuying, petitioned to protest in a designated area in Beijing during the Olympics.  
The women were protesting the meager compensation they received when their homes 
were seized for urban redevelopment of Beijing.  Instead of receiving a license to protest, 
both women were given the extra-judicial sentence of “re-education through labor.”  The 
two women were informed by police that their sentence would be commuted if they 
would promise to stay at home during the Olympics and stop asking for permission to 
protest.116 
Wu and Wang are not the first citizens to be detained, or simply disappear, after 
petitioning the government to protest.  Some human rights activists charge that the 
application process was only set up to lure protesters out so that they could be silenced 
during the Games.  Four days before the Olympic Games, Chinese Officials had not 
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allowed a single protest.  The police have received 77 protest applications, but each has 
been dropped as the issues have been “solved through consultation, dialogue.”117 
Police violence is widespread in China.  In the months leading up to the Olympics 
the police have been especially sensitive to protecting their image.  In preparation for the 
International Olympic Committee’s visit, a 41-year-old man, Wang Chaoru was removed 
from his home by the police.  The neighborhood committee had instructed them to do so 
in order to prevent him from embarrassing the city.  Wang’s crime was that he was 
mentally challenged.  Instead of being held temporarily and returned to his home 
following the Committee’s departure, he was beaten to death while in police custody.118 
Citizens are not the only ones at risk, however.  On August 4, 2008, Chinese 
paramilitary police beat two Japanese journalists and damaged their equipment as they 
attempted to cover the attacks against police in Kashgar.  The government apologized to 
the journalists and stated that the police were just short-tempered due to ongoing 
attacks.119 
Violence is not confined to the police force.  China is also well known for their 
excessive use of the death penalty.  In 2007, 470 people were officially put to death in 
China, while Amnesty International estimates the true number to be in the thousands. The 
death penalty is the punishment for more than 60 crimes in China, ranging from 
embezzling to damaging electric power plants.  Most of those sentenced find swift 
justice, as they are executed within weeks of sentencing. 120   
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C. BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE?  
1. Legal System 
In order for a nation to move forward with significant infrastructure and political 
change, they must have a justice system which meets basic international standards.  In 
other words, they must be able to enforce policies consistently; individuals should have 
the right to a fair trial, and to avoid arbitrary detention.  In the criminal justice system in 
the Chinese Communist Party, many of these rights are sidetracked by using extra 
judicial punishment.  The use of this punishment means that many of those accused never 
see trial but may spend years in “re-education camps.” 121  
The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has been able to make minor in roads towards 
the end of justice over the past decade.   Despite their efforts, reforms are slow.  
According to Jerome Cohen, ratifying the United Nations International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as ensuring compliance with this covenant by 
enacting new legislation will create more rapid reforms.  The Criminal Procedure Laws in 
China allow suspects to speak with their lawyers while detained, confront those who 
accuse them, and hold a formal hearing rather than just review records of cases under 
appeal.  What is not delineated, however, is the definition of presumption of innocence 
and a suspect’s right to silence to prevent self-incrimination.122 
Thus far, the only major change the SPC has made is a reduction in the number of 
death penalty cases.  The SPC has the final review of all death penalty cases.  The SPC 
has also encouraged the courts to suspend the death sentence for two years in order to 
determine if the individual can be rehabilitated.123 
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2. Internet Freedom 
In 2004, Shi Tao, a reporter for the Dangdai Shang Bao of Hunan, forwarded his 
description of political directives given to Chinese journalists regarding the coverage of 
the fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Shi Tao was eventually 
sentenced to ten years in prison.  He was identified by digital fingerprints given to the 
Chinese government by a Yahoo subsidiary. Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Nortel Networks, 
Sun Microsystems and Yahoo all operate the internet systems within China.  They must 
do so under the CCP’s “Golden Shield.”  In other words, these companies must censor 
the services they provide in order to meet with the strict standards of the CCP.124 
The Golden Shield is also known as the “Great Firewall of China.”  It began in 
1998 and is estimated to have cost 800 million dollars. It is estimated that around 30,000 
police are involved in the project.  It has the ability to block content by preventing IP 
addresses from being routed through and consists of standard firewall and proxy servers 
at the Internet gateways. It can also provide DNS poisoning when specific sites are 
requested. While the government does not appear to be systematically monitoring 
content, they are censoring key word searches and ensuring that controversial topics are 
not available.125 
Chinese officials promised to completely unblock internet access for visitors 
during the Olympic Games.  Officials stated that there would be limited restrictions 
within hotel room and computer banks reserved for journalists.  This promise was only 
partially fulfilled.  The IOC supported Beijing’s continued censoring of the internet.  Any 
site which presented controversial data would simply not load.126 
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3. Transparency 
Transparency was first used to describe trade relations when the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was established following World War Two.  
Since then, the definition of transparency in government has expanded to virtually every 
realm.  The more transparent a nation’s government is, the less incidence of corruption 
and violations of human rights within that nation.  Historically, Beijing is not known for 
its transparency.  Most recently they have been asked to reveal the true numbers of 
executions conducted each year, but have not complied.127  Along these lines, human 





















                                                 
127 “China ‘Gold Medal’ for Executions.” BBC News, April 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7346938.stm (accessed August 1, 2008). 
 39
IV. “IF THE COST OF HOSTING THE OLYMPICS IS TEARS, 
BLOOD, LIVES AND THE EVICTION OF PEOPLE FROM THEIR 
HOMES, THEN WE WOULD RATHER NOT HAVE THESE 
OLYMPICS”128 
A. RELOCATION OF URBAN RESIDENTS 
In an effort to make Beijing appear more beautiful and prevent protest in the lead-
up to the Olympic Games, many citizens were either forced to leave the city or their 
homes were strategically covered from tourist view.  At times, local officials were over-
zealous in their attempts to remove obstacles to the success of the Olympic Games.  
Again, this negatively impacts Beijing’s image and thus its influence via soft power. 
A block of homes along the Olympic Marathon route in Beijing has proven to be 
an obstacle to the clean image of Beijing.  Despite pressure to move, residents and shop 
owners have refused to vacate the building.  After months of coercion proved 
unsuccessful, an unsigned letter was posted on the shops on July 17th.  It simply stated, 
“In keeping with the government’s request to rectify the Olympic environment, a wall 
will need to be built around No. 93 South Tianqiao Road.”  The following morning, 
bricklayers arrived to cover the unsightly buildings with a ten foot high wall.  Thus, 
making it impossible for the small shops to take advantage of Olympic traffic.129 
Beijing’s Municipal Construction Committee (BMCC) claims that only 14,901 
people from 6,307 households were relocated in order to facilitate Olympic construction.  
The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) disputes this figure however.  
The COHRE claims that 1.25 million people have been displaced.  The disparity in these 
numbers can be easily explained by the definition each group utilized to gather data.  The 
                                                 
128 Sharon K. Hom, “The Promise of a ‘People’s Olympics,’” in China’s Great Leap: The Beijing 
Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges, ed. Minky Worden (New York: Seven Stories Press, 
2008), 68. 
129Jake Hooker, “Before Guests Arrive, Beijing Hides Some Messes,” New York Times, July 29, 
2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/sports/olympics/29beijing.html?scp=1&sq=beijing%20hides%20som
e%20messes&st=Search (accessed September 8, 2008). 
 40
BMCC only included individuals who had been displaced for the construction a specific 
Olympic venue, whereas the COHRE reflects all those who were displaced by 
construction to make Beijing more modern and able to handle the rapid influx of 
people.130  Additionally, the BMCC claims that all individuals moved voluntarily and 
were adequately compensated.131 
In order to receive compensation, families had to prove ownership.  If they were 
able to do so, they were given approximately $87,500.  Displaced persons and their 
advocates dispute this claim.  They argue that compensation money was taken by corrupt 
local officials.  They also state that if a resident refused to leave, the police used heavy 
handed tactics in order to remove them forcibly.  Furthermore, the compensation did not 
always match the value of the property.  Renters received no compensation for 
relocation.132 
B. UNREST IN TIBET 
1. Protest within Tibet 
The sovereignty of Tibet has been under protest for centuries.  Both the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China agree that Tibet became a part of China 
during the Yuan dynasty.  Unfortunately, Tibet does not agree that this is the case.  
Followers of the Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan Government in Exile, believe that 
Tibet is an autonomous state.  While this debate is ongoing, protests were taken very 
seriously in the lead up to the Beijing Olympic Games.133 
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International protests over the status of Tibet were rampant during the year 
preceding the Olympics, but they were nothing new.  Western nations have long shown 
emotional support for Tibetan independence. That being the case, the Chinese 
government was less concerned over these longstanding protests than they were the 
internal turmoil which became more heated in the months immediately prior to the 
Games and prompted significantly more international reaction. 
On March 10, 2008, the forty-ninth anniversary of a failed Tibetan uprising in 
1959, the people of Tibet gathered in protest against Chinese policies in Tibet. The 
protests then turned violent with Tibetans attacking other ethnic groups leading to rioting 
and looting.  The response of the Chinese government to the violent protests in Tibet was 
harsh.  In Western opinion, it was disproportional to the threat posed by the uprising.  In 
the opinion of officials in Beijing, the appropriate steps were taken in order to protect the 
sovereignty of the Chinese state.  Information on the actual methods of crackdown is 
scarce, as the Chinese government removed all foreign journalists from the area 
following the beginning of the protests.  Chinese officials released a death toll of only 18 
people; however, some reports indicate that up to 350 people were killed as a result of the 
riots.134 
Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the People’s Republic of China, blamed the fourteenth 
Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, for inciting the protests.  The Dalai Lama retorted that they 
were just the natural manifestation of widespread discontent in Tibet.  The argument then 
reached the international stage with many Western nations siding with the Tibetan 
Government in exile.  The result of Western criticism was a massive backlash of 
nationalism amongst the non-Tibetan Chinese population.  They did not feel it was the 
place of Western powers to try to interfere with internal Chinese affairs.  The furor 
surrounding these events was briefly interrupted when the world was distracted by the 
Sichuan Earthquake.135  
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2. Protest Along the Torch Route 
The Olympic Torch traveled across six continents over 34 days.136  In every 
major Western city through which the Olympic torch travelled, it was met with protest.  
The vast majority of these protestors were denouncing the CCP’s stance in relation to 
Tibet.  However, there was a large contingent of pro-China and Beijing Olympic 
supporters. 
London was the first Western city to host the Olympic torch on April 6.  By the 
end of the day, 37 protestors had been arrested.  Even with an increased police presence 
throughout the city as well as unpublished route changes, the protestors continued to 
harass torchbearers.  One protester even attempted to steal the torch from the hands of 
Konnie Huq.  The Olympic torch relay spokesman, Qu Yingpu stated, "This is not the 
right time, the right platform, for any people to voice their political views.  So we are 
very grateful and very thankful to the people in London, the police and the organizers, for 
their efforts trying to keep order."137 
The next day, April 7th, the torch arrived in Paris.  The flame was met with 
spectacular protests.  The last leg of the route had to be cancelled all together after the 
flame was extinguished at least five times.  At some points, the police had to use tear gas 
to remove protestors who were lying in the road.  Protestors even toppled a wheelchair 
athlete in an attempt to grab the torch.  Even Paris’ mayor got involved by hanging a 
banner from city hall which read "Paris City of Human Rights."138 
The torch arrived in San Francisco on April 9.  Not surprisingly, it was met with 
protest there as well.  In order to prevent the level of protest which occurred in Paris and 
London, the published route was not used.  Thousands of protesters waiting at the 
published end of the route never had a chance to voice their sentiments.  Angry protestors 
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on both sides felt that the city’s hiding of the flame did not give any party a chance to see 
the flame or voice their issues.  While they waited for a torch which never arrived, 
several scuffles broke out amongst the protestors.139  
C. SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE 
On May 12, 2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake rocked the Sichuan Province.  
Following the initial earthquake, tens of thousands of aftershocks further shook the 
province.  In the end, nearly 70,000 people were killed and 18,000 people were 
missing.140  Beijing’s reaction to the earthquake proved to be a positive reflection on both 
the government and the Chinese people.  The ability of both to join together in order to 
save as many lives as possible was a demonstration of the strength of the nation which 
temporarily improved China’s soft power. 
Shortly after the massive earthquake, Wen Jiabao flew to manage the rescue 
work, at some points in tears.  Meanwhile Hu Jintao promised a rapid disaster response.  
The Chinese government was praised for their quick response to the tragedy, as well as 
their level of openness with the media and the Western world.  In the largest mark of 
national mourning since the death of Deng Xiaoping, a three day mourning period was 
observed starting May 19, 2008.  On the same day, people spontaneously broke into 
nationalistic cheers.  Crowds were seen shouting “Go China!” while punching their fists 
in the air.141  
In the weeks following the earthquake, the parents of hundreds of students who 
were killed in collapsed schools began to demand answers.  They felt that the school 
buildings were the products of faulty construction. When these parents began to  
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protest, their images were powerful.  Standing before the rubble where their children had 
passed away, they placed signs protesting the construction and flowers honoring their 
dead.142   
When local officials saw the protests, they immediately removed the signs and the 
flowers.  Following public protest over the removal of flowers, officials replaced those, 
but not the signs.143  In the end, the central government admitted that over 7,000 schools 
had been inadequately engineered.144  For parents who had lost an only child, they were 
allowed to have a second “replacement” child with no fees.145  This was little comfort to 
parents who were too old to conceive again or had been volunteeringly sterilized.  Some 
parents have even been offered pensions in order to prevent them from launching further 
protests.146 
D. DARFUR 
Steven Spielberg was hired as a creative director of the Beijing Olympics.  Two 
months before the Games, he refused to participate.  He stated that China’s inaction in 
Darfur should not be supported.  He encouraged further protest and potential boycott of 
the Beijing Games.  Further, he believed that China should use their influential business 
ties in Darfur to encourage an end to the violence.  China’s initial response was that their 
actions in Darfur were in keeping with their policy of non-interference in another nation’s 
sovereign affairs.147  
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Beijing’s fear was that Steven Spielberg’s protest would cause major contributors 
to back out of the Games or incite further challenges by celebrities.   He was actually late 
to join a group of celebrities to publicly protest China’s role in Darfur leading up the 
Games.  Mia Farrow, a Goodwill Ambassador to the United Nations, was outspoken in 
her objections to the Beijing Olympics.  She started a campaign in March to have the 
2008 Games labeled, the “Genocide Olympics.”148   
In April, Zhai Jun, a senior Chinese official was dispatched to Darfur to 
encourage the Sudanese government to welcome a UN Peacekeeping force in the region.  
While in the region, Mr. Zhai even toured three refugee camps.  Even though his actions 
show a modest concession to Darfur activists, he stated that individuals who want to 
boycott the Games are “either ignorant or ill natured.” As Beijing does not typically 
attempt to interfere with the sovereignty of other nations, they did not make any specific 
demands of the Sudanese government.  Mr. Zhai suggested that, “the Sudan side show 
flexibility and accept” United Nations peacekeepers.149  In this case, international 
pressure related to the Games actually had a positive, but minimal affect on Chinese 
foreign policy. 
E. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Beijing repeatedly promised that journalists and visitors to Beijing would be 
granted unrestrained internet access.  When journalists arrived, they found this was not 
the case.  Reporters were not able to access web sites that discussed issues of Taiwanese 
independence, Tiananment Square protests, Tibet, Amnesty International or newspapers 
which are known for open political debate.  The restrictions on reporters are exactly 
contrary to what had been promised by both Beijing and the IOC and strongly resemble 
the restrictions on the Internet which face Chinese citizens.  Additionally, it  
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undermines the argument that the Olympics would help to make China more open to the 
international community and therefore further undermines the use of the Olympics to 
increase China’s soft power.150  
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V. OLYMPIC GOALS ATTAINED? 
A. PUBLIC IMAGE 
1. Opening Ceremony 
The Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was filled with meaning and 
grandeur for the host nation.  Sadly two choices marred the success of this ceremony.  
First, officials chose to use pre-recorded fireworks to supplement the show.151  Second, 
the child who sang the national anthem lip synched.  Since she was cuter than her 
classmate, she was given the honor of providing a face for the Games.152  Both of these 
choices led some Chinese citizens to feel that they were made to look foolish.  Knowing 
that they could provide both successful fireworks and adorable child singers made many 
question the need for deception.  
More than 100 “national government dignitaries” attended the Beijing Olympic 
Games, but officials did not say how many attended the Opening Ceremony.  Several 
world leaders chose not to attend the ceremony.  American, Australian, French, and 
Taiwanese leaders all chose to attend.  British, German, and Canadian leaders were not 
present.  Also not in attendance were the leaders of Sudan, Zimbabwe, Iran, and North 
Korea.153 
2. American Killed 
On August 9, an American couple visiting Beijing to watch their cousin coach the 
Men’s indoor volleyball team was attacked by a Chinese citizen.  The assailant killed 
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Todd Bachman and seriously injured his wife, Barbara, before committing suicide.154  
The incident was the only one of this nature at the Games; however it garnered 
significant international attention at the start of the Games. 
3. Controversy on the Chinese Women’s Gymnastic Team 
In order to compete in gymnastics at the Olympic level, athletes must be at least 
16 years of age.  A month prior to the Olympic Games, a member of China’s female 
gymnastic team, He Kexin, was listed in local documents as being too young to compete 
in the Games.  Chinese officials denied the veracity of local newspapers in reporting the 
ages and maintained their claim that the athletes could compete.155  As the Chinese team 
won gold largely as a result of these athletes’ efforts, the IOC was urged to investigate 
further.  The IOC’s investigation lasted five and a half weeks and concluded that the 
athletes were eligible to compete.  Many question the IOC’s findings, however, due to the 
paucity of documentation available to make a certain conclusion. 
4. Medals Won 
While American athletes achieved the highest number of medals at the Olympic 
Games, Chinese athletes were awarded the highest number of gold medals.  Both the 
American men and women were awarded 53 total medals, while the Chinese men were 
awarded 42 medals and the Chinese women were awarded 57.  In this respect, the 
Chinese athletes fell ten medals short of their goal of dominated the Olympic medal race.    
5. Impact of Russian Invasion of Georgia 
On the day of the opening ceremony, Russian forces invaded Georgia.  The 
swiftness and brutality of this invasion shocked the international community.  Over the 
course of the Olympic Games, much attention was focused away from sport and thrust  
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upon the failure of diplomacy.  Many predicted that this event was the beginning of a 
new Cold War.  The Russian actions significantly lessened the impact of the Beijing 
Games on the World. 
B. POLICY CHANGES MADE 
1. Press Freedom 
Press freedom in China is largely the same as it was prior to the Olympics.  
Foreign journalists must still request permission to visit controversial areas.  Journalists 
are also still subject to incarceration and harassment.  In fact, the Olympic Games caused 
Beijing authorities to enforce even more strict standards of behavior.  It can be concluded 
that press freedom was negatively affected by Beijing hosting the Olympic Games. 
2. Human Rights 
As was the case with press freedom, human rights were negatively impacted by 
the Olympic Games.  Not only were people relocated in mass— including millions of 
migrant workers—but they were forced into house arrest if they applied to protest.  The 
legal system has seen limited reforms.  China still boasts the largest number of executions 
and an unknown number of political prisoners. 
In one minor concession, Beijing did reach out on the Darfur issue.  They were 
not willing to go so far as to demand action, but they were at least willing to request that 
Sudan consider U.N. intervention.  They have not, however, shifted any of their trade 
with Sudan in order to encourage that change. 
C. POSSIBILITIES FOR LONG TERM-CHANGE 
While hosting of the Olympic Games shows little short-term improvement, the 
continued openness of the Chinese government to the outside world will no doubt lead to 




involve greater interdependence with foreign economies.  The question becomes one of 
whether the international community will influence Chinese politics or whether China 
will influence international politics. 
Using the Olympic Games as an example of the future of Chinese interaction with 
other nations, one can assume that the Chinese government will continue to make 
changes.  These changes will not be at a pace determined by foreign powers, but at a 
speed that is comfortable for the CCP and the Chinese people.  Human rights and 
environmental issues will continue to improve as the legal system improves.  Many of the 
changes will be in line with Western demands, but the changes will be strictly Chinese.  
As foreign powers used rhetoric instead of action in their attempts to change Beijing prior 
to the Games, they will do the same in future issues regarding social change in China.   
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